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Bailouts: An Essay on Conflicts of Interest and Ethics When
Government Pays the Tab
Richard W. Painter*
I. INTRODUCTION

In January 2009, I published a book on reform of government ethics law,
lobbying regulation, and campaign finance.' Just as my book was going to press
in the fall of 2008, the United States government was embarking on an enormous
bailout of the financial industry. My concerns regarding inadequacies in
government ethics law are even greater when government officials direct trillions
of dollars toward private companies. With last minute revisions, my book
suggested several ways in which the bailout was worrisome.' Having a year to
observe the financial services bailout and bailouts of other industries, 3 I believe a
stronger statement is required. Existing government ethics rules are inadequate
for implementing bailouts in a manner that preserves public confidence in the
most expensive decisions our government makes.
This Essay identifies specific concerns I have regarding government ethics
and bailouts. This is a preliminary discussion of topics for future research and
write more on this
deliberation,
4 not a definitive analysis of the subject. I will
S
subject later, but it is important to raise some issues now.
Many concerns I discuss in the bailout context are also relevant to
government ethics generally. These concerns include the role of political
favoritism and campaign money in government decisions, movement of senior
personnel between government and the private sector, relatively lax ethics rules
for federal contractors, abuse of inside information about government decisions,
and other issues. Bailouts, however, are unique in several respects: the enormous
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1. RICHARD W. PAINTER, GET7ING THE GOVERNMENT AMERICA DESERVES: How ETHICS REFORM CAN
MAKE A DIFFERENCE (2009).

2. Id. at 39 (conflicts of interest from pensions and investments owned by government employees
involved in bailouts), 44 (conflicts of interest from former employers of government employees), 54 (conflicts
of interest involving prospective future employers), 64-65 (Treasury Department officials' use of information
about investment banks and other companies receiving bailouts), 166-67 (insider trading on government
information about bailouts).
3. The bailout of two of the three largest American car manufacturers is discussed further below.
Regardless of what types of arrangements are defined as "bailouts," the government's economic intervention in
response to the 2008-2009 financial collapse has been far reaching. Freezing of credit markets, for example, has
forced the Federal Reserve to step in as a lender to fill a vacuum left by banks unwilling to lend. See Edmund L.
Andrews, Lender's Role for Fed Makes Some Uneasy, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 2009, at AI (recounting how Fed
officials "have been dragged into murky battles over the creditworthiness" of particular industries, including
"motor homes, rental cars, snowmobiles, recreational boats and farm equipment"). "If the Fed cannot extract
itself quickly, [a growing number of economists] warn, the crucial task of allocating credit will become more
political and less subject to rigorous economic analysis." Id.
4. This Essay is a precursor for a book on the same topic.
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magnitude of government expenditure required; the intricate financial
relationships linking companies that receive bailouts with other companies; the
wealth and social influence of individuals who benefit from bailouts in the
financial services industry; and the dearth of procedural rules constraining
government employees in bailouts compared with detailed regulations for
procurement, investigations, adjudications and most other particular party matters
for which government employees make decisions about the fates of particular
companies.
This Essay discusses conflicts of interest and government ethics, not the
economic utility or social policy of bailouts. Conflicts of interest and other ethics
problems, however, affect economics. Ethics problems can cause federal bailout
money to be spent inefficiently. Lack of public confidence in government
decisions regarding bailouts-and lack of predictability in bailout decisions-can
also undermine investor confidence in financial markets.
Not all bailouts are alike. Some bailouts, such as bailouts of depository
institutions insured by the federal government, are routine and usually proceed
according to a prearranged script. Although government officials exercise some
discretion, statutes and regulations define parameters of government decisionmaking. Federal institutions such as the FDIC, staffed mostly by career officials,
administer these bailouts. Ethics problems have an impact, but the impact is less
because government officials have less discretion and decisions are less arbitrary.
Other bailouts are extraordinary because they involve companies that
ordinarily would be allowed to fail. Policymakers sometimes decide that these
companies are too big to fail or that for some other reason they should not fail.
These government decisions are highly discretionary. There are no prearranged
legal rules or institutions to implement rules. Political appointees make most of
these decisions, and sometimes the decisions can appear arbitrary (e.g., Bear
Stearns and AIG are bailed out, but Lehman Brothers is not). When conflicts of
interest and other ethics problems contribute to arbitrariness in government
decisions regarding extraordinary bailouts, officials may misspend public money,
eroding public confidence in government. This unpredictability may also cause
capital markets to react adversely.
While predictable bailouts in the first category are less challenging from an
ethics perspective than extraordinary bailouts in the second category,
predictability comes at a cost. Bailouts that are relatively certain and have
predefined parameters create a moral hazard for persons who own and manage
firms eligible to receive these bailouts. If left free to gamble with the
government's money, many would do so. For this reason, firms eligible to
receive predictable bailouts usually must comply with capital requirements,
restrictions on use of capital, periodic inspections, and other regulatory restraints.
Sometimes these risk oversight mechanisms break down. As I pointed out in
earlier commentary on the savings and loan crisis of the 1990s, bank managers
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and their lawyers are partially to blame.5 Ethical failings of government officials
who are supposed to regulate or oversee regulators are also to blame.6 However,
there is a system in place for the government to regulate and monitor risk
incurred by firms eligible to receive predictable bailouts, and this system usually
works.
For firms receiving extraordinary bailouts in the second category,
mechanisms for external monitoring of risk before a bailout have been weak or
nonexistent. Uncertainty about whether there will be a bailout, who will get a
bailout, and the amount of a potential bailout diminishes the moral hazard
somewhat if economic actors know they could get nothing. Investment banks, for
example, are not legally entitled to bailouts, and persons managing, investing in,
or loaning money to investment banks generally assume they are on their own. If,
however, bailouts become more common and predictable for investment banks,
or any other industry, moral hazard increases.' This is the worst of both worlds,
because moral hazard typical of predictable bailouts is combined with lax
government oversight of firms that are allowed to assess and assume their own
risks but then are not allowed to fail.
This Essay does not focus on the skewed incentives inside these firms but
instead on the skewed incentives inside the government agencies that make
bailout decisions. The purpose of this Essay is not to propose a solution to
conflicts of interest and other government ethics problems or even to assess the
magnitude and economic impact of these problems, which varies according to the
specifics of a particular bailout. The purpose here is to point out the types of
problems likely to arise in bailouts and that government ethics law has not kept
up. Another purpose is to suggest that proposed solutions to government ethics
problems have a broader impact and can be costly-some more costly than the
problems they purport to solve.
II. RECURRING ETHICS PROBLEMS IN BAILOUTS
Companies frequently separate shareholder ownership and managerial
control.' Corporate law provides statutory and judicial solutions for agency
5. See Richard W. Painter & Jennifer E. Duggan, Lawyer Disclosureof Corporate Fraud: Establishing a
Firm Foundation, 50 SMU L. REV. 225,261-63 (1996) (proposing legislative provisions for lawyers resembling
what eventually became section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002).
6. The prominent politicians with close ties to Lincoln Savings and Loan chief Charles Keating were the
most notorious example in the late 1980s.
7. Although Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs avoided a bailout and gained access to federal funds
by switching to a commercial bank holding company structure in 2008, many more investment banks have
never made the switch and remain subject to relatively loose regulatory restraints imposed on firms that are not
federally insured. President Obama has proposed a sweeping overhaul of financial services regulation that
would include safety and soundness, but the final shape of the legislation that passes Congress has yet to be
determined.
8.

See ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE

PROPERTY 119-25 (1932).
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problems between shareholders and managers while allowing some flexibility for
private ordering. By contrast, the relationship between companies and their
creditors is principally contractual-in the form of loan agreements, bond
indentures, etc. A good contract limits the inherent moral hazards a company
may face when it takes risks with creditors' money.
Explaining what went wrong and why we need government bailouts is
beyond the scope of this Essay, although I will mention a few possibilities. When
banks and other firms took large positions in derivatives and other complex
investments, corporate law might have given too much deference to managers
under the "business judgment rule." 9 Bonus-driven compensation for managers
also may have contributed to excessive risk-taking. It is possible that contractual
arrangements with creditors, which are usually effective in controlling traditional
types of risk, may have failed to keep up with the economic reality of
transactions. Lawyers who drafted those contracts may not have understood the
economic underpinnings. Another culprit may have been the government's
failure to regulate the complex financial instruments involved.' In the mortgage
market, government sponsored enterprises (GSEs), most notably Freddie Mac
and Fannie Mae, contributed significantly to the level of risk and used political
clout and skilled lobbying to impede efforts to curtail their activities."
The failure in the auto industry has different explanations, including the
possibility that car companies were not managed in a manner consistent with the
interests of shareholders, creditors, or customers. Unions also had a powerful role
in the industry and may not always have made workplace efficiency a top
priority. The political influence of and lobbying by car companies and unions
discouraged the government from intervening until it was time for a bailout.
Thus, bad corporate management, sometimes combined with bad government
regulation, may give rise to the need for a bailout. Bailouts, however, involve
new problems of separation of ownership from control. Public money managed
by government employees is injected into financial services firms, car

9. For the latest rendition of the business judgment rule in Delaware, see In re Citigroup Inc. S'holder
Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106 (Del. Ch. 2009) (distinguishing risky business decisions from illegal conduct
and imposing an extremely high burden on plaintiffs in suits alleging failure of directors to monitor for business
risk). The business judgment rule is a rebuttable presumption that corporate directors making a business
decision were disinterested and independent and acted on an informed basis, in good faith, and for a proper
business purpose. Absent rebuttal of this presumption, a court generally will not second guess the directors'
business decision.
10. Lobbying for loose regulation by trade associations such as the International Swaps and Derivatives
Association is a separate government ethics issue discussed in my book, but not discussed further here. See
PAINTER, supra note 1, at 227-28 (discussing how, among other things, the International Swaps and Derivatives
Association was successful in getting its former chief lobbyist appointed and confirmed as a commissioner of
the Commodities Futures Trading Commission).
11. The Bush Administration claimed that these GSEs were a significant cause of the financial collapse
in 2008 and that it had warned about the risks they posed for the economy. See Office of the White House Press
Secretary, Just the Facts: The Administration's Unheeded Warnings About the Systemic Risk Posed by the
GSEs, Sept. 19, 2008, http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2008/09/20080919-15.html
(on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
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manufacturers, and other companies. Government employees who make bailout
decisions invest the public's money and also may help run companies if they get
board seats, hire or fire senior corporate managers, or otherwise influence
business policies in return for bailout money. Most of the government officials
making these decisions are not elected, although in the executive branch they
report to the president. Members of Congress also have a role in some bailout
decisions.
When public money is invested in private companies, the public gets an
ownership stake in debt, equity, or both. Besides the power of the ballot,
however, the public has few mechanisms to control the conduct of government
employees managing this trillion dollar enterprise. Shareholders in a company
that does not accept government bailout funds sometimes do not have much
control over managers either-an issue of concern for advocates of expanded
corporate democracy-but even these shareholders probably have more options
at their disposal (e.g., proxy fights, tender offers, etc.) than the public has if it is
dissatisfied with the management of government bailout funds. Public owners
(i.e., taxpayers) must wait for the next scheduled election to act upon their views
of the government's bailout managers. In this respect, government bailouts
epitomize the separation of ownership from control that until now has been
viewed principally as a problem of the private sector.
Government ethics law is one of the few mechanisms that can influence the
conduct of managers employed by the government. This Essay discusses whether
government ethics law as currently written and administered is up to the task.
I briefly identify below some problems with bailouts that could be classified
under the general heading of "government ethics." The framework I use here, as
in my book, is a "fiduciary principle"' 2 binding government officials to the public
interest that they purport to serve. Government ethics rules, financial disclosure
rules, procurement rules, and other bodies of law regulating government officials
should minimize departures from the fiduciary principle (whether these rules in
fact do so is a subject discussed generally in my book and discussed in the
bailout context below).
A. PoliticalPayback
Politics is a persistent factor in government decision-making. Some political
considerations are not necessarily inconsistent with the fiduciary principle-for
example, a member of Congress favoring his or her own district in expenditure
deliberations. Other political considerations, such as a member supporting
expenditures in another member's district in return for an endorsement for
reelection, are more questionable. A member's favoritism toward those who

12. See PAINTER, supra note 1, at 1-6 (explaining that one of the main goals of a fiduciary in the public
sector should be transparency and accountability).
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supported his election to office may also raise suspicion, since once elected he is
supposed to represent everyone in his district. An executive branch official's
favoritism toward persons who supported election of the president is questionable
on similar grounds, although it is also a common practice.
When government bails out the private sector, the public expects members of
Congress to support companies in their own districts and expects members from
states such as New York to favor a generous approach toward, for example, the
financial services industry. However, the public probably neither expects nor
wants "Republican" firms to do better than "Democratic" firms or vice versa
depending on which party controls Congress or the executive branch.
Appropriate parameters of politicized decision-making are difficult to define, but
there are limits to what the public considers acceptable.
Although there are limits, the law does not necessarily define those limits.
Sometimes voters identify inappropriately politicized decisions and impose their
own sanctions on elected officials who go too far. Because voters have flexibly,
their sanctions are sometimes more effective than sanctions for violations of
written rules, which involve both procedural and standard-of-proof requirements.
Flexibility, however, is also a weakness of political sanctions because it can lead
to inconsistency. Sometimes a member of Congress or a president is sufficiently
popular that voters refuse to impose a political penalty for excessively political
decision-making. Sometimes important segments of the electorate want
politicized decision-making and can prevail, even if the majority prefers a less
politicized approach.
Commentators on "public choice theory" have analyzed how political factors
play out when economic resources are allocated by government instead of by
markets. 3 When markets in political influence emerge around government actors
who allocate resources, departures from the fiduciary principle may occur,
although, as pointed out above, some political influences may be consistent with
the fiduciary principle. A legislator favoring a company or industry in his own
district, for example, may be consistent with fiduciary obligations to the persons
who elected him, but favoritism toward a campaign contributor may not be.
Departures from the fiduciary principle are discussed here as a problem of
"government ethics," but to some degree this is part of how government works.
Controls on politicized decision-making imposed by procedural or substantive
law, the character of public servants, and the character of the electorate are all
factors that influence how much and in what way politics influence policy.
The legislative and executive branches both make government decisions on
bailouts. Once funds have been appropriated for bailouts and broad parameters
set by statute, executive officials make most implementation decisions under the
watchful eye of Congress. Apart from the president and the vice president,

13. See generally FRED S. MCCHESNEY, MONEY FOR NOTHING: POLITICIANS, RENT EXTRACTION, AND
POLITICAL EXTORTION (1997).
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executive branch officials are not elected to office. They are, however, appointed
by the president and his staff, who do consider politics in their decisions.
Political operatives in the president's political party and their supporters have
varying degrees of influence upon, and access to, executive branch officials.
There is likely to be more such influence when executive branch officials are
permitted, and in fact encouraged, to participate in "personal capacity" partisan
political activity. This is where the White House Office of Political Affairs
(OPA) has a critical role. Karl Rove ran OPA for much of the George W. Bush
Administration. Under President Obama, Patrick Gaspard, a labor union advisor
from New York, runs OPA. OPA staff members moonlight in their "personal
capacities" for the president's political party by, among other things, speaking at
campaign events, coordinating strategy with candidates, and facilitating political
work by other administration officials. OPA officials also recruit political
appointees in the agencies, sometimes including cabinet members and4 their
deputies, to speak at political events and perform other duties for the party.'
When political appointees participate in partisan political activity and then
make bailout decisions, it should not be surprising that bailout decisions are
politicized. However, it is difficult to determine the extent to which these
decisions will be affected by partisan political activity. Appearances also can be
worse than reality. It should be a matter of concern, for example, that there was a
very active OPA during the George W. Bush Administration and that on October
3, 2008, one month before the presidential election, Congress authorized the
Secretary of the Treasury to spend up to $700 billion on bailing out the financial
services industry. However, a Democrat-controlled Congress authorized the
bailout and most of the money was not committed to specific banks until after the
election. It is also unlikely that Secretary Paulson and other Treasury officials
participated in significant partisan political activity in the months prior to the
election, although their White House counterparts in the National Economic
Council may have done so (there is simply no way of knowing for sure, because
there are no publicly available records of government officials' political activity).

14. The Hatch Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 7321-7326 (2006), prohibits government officials from engaging in
political activity using official titles or at government expense. PAINTER, supra note 1, at 245. Most government
officials may not participate in political activity while on government property or during working hours. An
exception in the Hatch Act regulations, however, allows senior political appointees to do so provided they do
not use their official titles or incur additional expense for the government. This exception permits some people
to do both official and political work in the same office, provided they purport to distinguish between the two.
Numerous gadgets-BlackBerries, cell phones, computers-are thus provided by the Republican National
Committee (RNC) or the Democratic National Committee (DNC) to OPA staff and some other administration
officials. Id. at 250. Modern technology makes it easier than it once was for these officials to coordinate with
political campaigns. Calls coming from White House officials on DNC cell phones and emails sent on DNC
BlackBerries are, legally, not coming from the White House at all. They are merely "personal capacity"
communications by persons who happen to be White House staff. In many respects, however, these distinctions
are more theoretical than real. In most administrations, OPA staff members use the same internal reporting
structure to coordinate political activity that they use for official duties. When they make phone calls or send
email, everyone knows where they work. When they speak at campaign events, everyone knows who they are.
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Nonetheless, even if politics had no effect on the Administration's bailout
decisions, appearances would have been better if President Bush had asked OPA
to stand down from its efforts to entangle the Administration's political
appointees, or at least appointees involved with the bailout, in partisan politics.
The two Chrysler bailouts in 1979 and 2009 provide another illustration of
the difficulties affiliated with assessing degrees and types of political influences
and with distinguishing policy decisions from politics. The Carter Administration
probably considered Chrysler factories in Michigan and other Midwestern states
to be important in winning the 1980 presidential election. (President Reagan set
up the formal structure of the White House OPA, but President Carter did have
some political advisors in the White House). There were also, however, policy
reasons to save Chrysler at a time when inflation and economic stagnation
plagued the rest of the manufacturing sector. "But for" political factors in the
bailout decision are difficult to identify.
When Chrysler failed again thirty years later and went into Chapter 11
bankruptcy, executive branch officials in the Obama Administration again
injected federal money into Chrysler. Labor unions and other creditors fought
over competing claims on Chrysler, and some critics have claimed that the
administration favored labor. 5 President Obama and his staff might have been
predisposed from a policy perspective to favor union creditors over other lenders
in shaping the plan for Chrysler to emerge from bankruptcy. But lenders had
good arguments on policy grounds, particularly if the Administration was
concerned about whether other companies could borrow money in the future.
Thus, the best approach to negotiations from a policy perspective may not have
been clear.
Against this background of uncertainty, a factor in the outcome could be that
Administration officials are reminded of where their loyalties lie when they meet
with labor union officials and other interest groups, including perhaps some
creditors, at political events. The impact of these events as a "but for" cause of
particular decisions is difficult to measure empirically. Few, if any, government
officials will admit that "political considerations" affected their decision-making.
President Obama's approach to the Chrysler bailout might have been the same
regardless of political connections members of his Administration had.
Nonetheless, in general, communications from interested parties to government
officials in the course of partisan political activity can make a difference, at least
at the margins, and, perhaps, well beyond the margins.
Appearances would be better for the Obama Administration if the OPA stood
down from some of its customary functions at least until most substantial
decisions in the current round of bailouts are made.' 6 Administration officials

15. E.g., Patrice Hill, Treasury Favors Unions in Chrysler Talks, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2009, http:II
www.washingtontimes.comnews/2009/apr/24ltreasury-favors-unions-over-banks-in-chrysler-talk/ (on file with
the McGeorge Law Review).
16. I suggest in my book that OPA in its current form be abolished and most of its work be moved to the
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involved in the bailouts-other than the president and vice president-should be
required to desist from personal capacity partisan political activity until their
work on the bailouts is done. 7

B. PoliticalMoney
Campaign contributions are a form of political payback. Political money has
been the source of scandals over many years, including the exchange of
campaign cash for peerages or knighthoods in Great Britain under Prime Minister
Lloyd George in the 1920s 8 and again under Prime Minister Tony Blair in the
early 2000s. Today, billions of dollars are spent on elections in the United States,
and it would be naive to assume that all of this money is donated simply for
philosophical reasons by persons who do not expect something tangible in return.
Unless and until the system of campaign finance is changed, political money will
influence government decisions. These decisions could be much more costly to
the public than the approach of British politicians who hand out peerages and
knighthoods to their contributors. The cost could be astronomical in government
bailouts, where hundreds of billions of dollars are at stake.
Political activity by executive branch officials also plays a role in providing
campaign contributors with access to executive branch officials at political
fundraisers. Although the Hatch Act prohibits government officials from
soliciting campaign contributions, they may give "personal capacity" speeches at
fundraisers, speeches which almost always discuss the government's official
business. Private discussions at these fundraisers are an ideal setting for exerting
influence. Contributors who want bailouts for certain companies know how to
ask. Contributors who want preferential treatment for certain constituenciese.g., stockholders, management, labor, or creditors-in a bailout also know how
to ask.
Here, empirical work could be useful. Is there a statistically significant
correlation between campaign contributions and the companies that receive

political party national committees. See PAINTER, supra note 1, at 245-53.
17. Empirical work on the impact of contacts made through partisan political activity is difficult because
the Federal Election Commission (FEC) database does not contain searchable information on which
government officials attend which political functions and which private sector persons also attend those same
functions. As pointed out in my book, one can find out from the FEC web page if one's neighbor or coworker
gave $250 to a campaign, but one cannot find out how many political trips Karl Rove took, where he went, and
who else was at the same political events that he attended. Id. at 259. Only the dollar amount and contribution
date for contributors is listed (there is no event information tied to the contributions), and information about
government officials attending political events with contributors is not accessible (the information does exist
because the White House or agency counsel's office generally signs off on political travel by staff). Id. This is
thus both too much and too little information provided by the FEC disclosure regime. Id.
18. For a long time, knighthoods and peerages were exchanged for political favors, but the system under
Lloyd George was notable for its scale and brazenness. See generally TOM CULLEN, MAUNDY GREGORY:
PURVEYOR OF HONOURS 26-31 (1974) (biography of the theatre producer and political operative who
implemented the scheme).
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bailout funds? When government makes decisions between various
constituencies of companies that receive bailouts-for example, prioritizing
creditors or allocating payments between creditors and shareholders-is there a
statistically significant correlation between campaign contributions and the
beneficiaries of those decisions? In some instances, such as car company
bailouts, the sample size may be too small to allow for a statistically significant
measurement. In other instances, such as financial services industry bailouts,
many companies are involved and the data might be statistically significant. The
fact that bailout decisions were made at the end of a Republican administration
and at the beginning of a Democratic administration might complicate such a
study. However, noticeable shifts in approach from one administration to the next
might shed light on the influence of campaign contributions. Some preferences
for campaign contributors will also have a policy rationale-e.g., Democrats'
policy orientation toward labor-making it harder to attribute a decision to
particular campaign contributions. At other times, however, contributions could
be a credible explanation for bailout decisions, such as where the Bush and the
Obama Administrations treated similarly situated persons differently. For
example, campaign contributions by chief executive officers who were forced out
by the government in one administration or the other could be compared with
contributions of those who were allowed to stay.
C. The Revolving Door into Government
Government officials who previously worked in industries receiving bailouts
benefit from prior private sector experience. Excessive ties to particular
companies in those industries, however, make ethics problems worse.
In recent years, Goldman Sachs has been accused of having an unfair
advantage in Washington. Many large banks, however, have had their turn in
government. In the 1907 financial crisis, the United States did not have a national
bank (the Federal Reserve Bank was established in 1914), so the Treasury
Department turned to J.P. Morgan & Co., which acted as a de facto national bank
in putting together a bailout deal.' 9 The U.S. Treasury paid $73 million
(approximately $1.6 billion in 2008 dollars) for bailouts, and J.P. Morgan, J.D.
Rockefeller, and other financiers added millions more. J.P. Morgan himself led
the negotiations and, at times, coerced the other lenders. Morgan made decisions
that today the Federal Reserve or the Treasury Department would make, even
though he had an obvious conflict of interest in this quasi-governmental role
because of his economic interest in the outcome. In subsequent years, the United
States has had senior government officials from other leading banks, including
Treasury Secretaries from Mellon Bank (Andrew Mellon, 1921-1932), Salomon

19.

See generally RON CHERNOW, THE HOUSE OF MORGAN: AN AMERICAN BANKING DYNASTY AND

THE RISE OF MODERN FINANCE (1990).
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Brothers (William Simon, 1974-1977), Merrill Lynch (Donald Regan, 19811985), and Dillon Read & Co. (C. Douglas Dillon, 1961-1965, and Nicholas
Brady, 1988-1993). The two most recent Treasury Secretaries from private banks
came from
Goldman Sachs (Robert Rubin, 1995-1999, and Henry Paulson, 200620
2009).
Secretary Rubin was criticized over conflicts of interest in bailouts of foreign
countries in the 1990s. In the 1995 bailout of Mexico, Rubin arguably had a
conflict of interest because Goldman had large exposure in Mexico. Similar
issues arose in the 1998 Asian currency bailout, when Goldman Sachs and other
large investment banks, again, had large exposure. Rubin, however, was legally
permitted to participate in these matters because he had sold all of his interest in
Goldman upon entering the government. Ethics rules then, as now, did not
require more.
Secretary Paulson presided over some of the most controversial bailouts in
history from September 2008 to January 2009. Goldman was, of course, affected.
Goldman itself, however, avoided becoming a direct party to bailouts given to
some other Wall Street firms, in part by gaining access to federal funds in a
different manner. In September 2008, Goldman and its rival, Morgan Stanley, put
themselves under commercial bank holding companies. As such, they gained
access to borrowing from the Federal Reserve in return for being subject to risk
management controls and other regulations applicable to commercial banks.
Nonetheless, Goldman had a substantial interest in bailouts given, or denied,
to other firms. The United States allowed Lehman Brothers, an old rival of
Goldman among the top tier of underwriter firms, to fail in 2008. The
government helped Merrill Lynch and Bear Stearns, two other firms that rivaled
Goldman in some business areas, merge into bank holding companies, Bank of
America and J.P. Morgan Chase, respectively. American International Group
(AIG), which owed Goldman up to $20 billion as a counterparty to various
derivatives contracts, was bailed out with a substantial infusion of government
cash (a portion of Goldman's exposure to AIG may have been insured or hedged
in contracts with other counterparties that might or might not have been able to
pay Goldman if AIG had failed).
Secretary Paulson was involved in many of these bailout decisions. His
involvement was legal because, like Secretary Rubin, he had divested himself of
any significant interest in Goldman upon entering the government in the summer
of 2006 (as the chief White House ethics officer, I coordinated this process prior
to his confirmation hearing). Paulson sold all of his Goldman stock at the thenprevailing price, which was significantly more than the stock would fetch today.2 '

20. See U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, History of the Treasury, http://www.treas.gov/education/history/
secretaries/ (last visited Oct. 27, 2009) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
21. Pursuant to government ethics regulations, Secretary Paulson was entitled to a "certificate of
divestiture," allowing deferral of the capital gains tax until such time as he sells the investments bought with the
proceeds of the stock sale. See 26 U.S.C. § 1043 (2009).
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The entire point of the stock sale was to allow him to participate in matters that
could affect Goldman and the rest of the financial services industry. Of course, at
the time, nobody knew how monumental such matters would be by the summer
of 2008.
Secretary Paulson brought several people from Goldman to fill top posts in
the Treasury Department. This influx of Goldman personnel magnified the
company's apparent influence in Washington. These individuals included Robert
K. Steele, a former Vice Chairman of Goldman, as Undersecretary for Domestic
Finance, and Neel Kashkari, who was recruited from a relatively junior position
at Goldman to serve as Assistant Secretary of the Treasury and oversee the 2008
bailout plan. Others were hired as special government employees or on a contract
basis to advise Treasury with the bailout, including: Kendrick Wilson, former
Chairman of the Goldman Sachs Financial Institutions Group; Dan Jester, former
Deputy Chief Financial Officer of Goldman; Steve Shafran, a retired principal of
Goldman; and Edward Forst, former head of Global Investment Banking for
Goldman.22 As several newspapers observed, "Government Sachs" had firmly
implanted itself in Washington.
The apparent arbitrariness of bailout decisions in 2008 and 2009 exacerbated
controversy over Goldman's influence. Uncertainty regarding government
decisions during this period (e.g., why bail out Bear Stearns and AIG, but not
Lehman?) increased speculation about the motives behind those decisions. The
rationale behind the decisions does not appear to have been explained with
sufficient clarity to let investors know how the government would respond to
whatever crises came next. A factual dispute also arose later regarding contacts
that Treasury Secretary Paulson had with Goldman Sachs personnel amidst the
financial crisis in the fall of 2008. This conduct raised questions as to whether
Secretary Paulson followed the terms of the ethics agreement 4 he signed upon

22. Special government employees are subject to federal conflict-of-interest statutes and other ethics
rules, but contract employees, generally, are not subject to the same rules and can retain financial holdings that
conflict with the work they do for the government.
23. See, e.g., Julie Creswell & Ben White, The Guys from 'Government Sachs,' N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19,
2008, at BU1.
24. The ethics agreement provides in part that, "As a prudential matter, I will not participate in any
particular matter involving specific parties in which the Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. ("Goldman Sachs") is or
represents a party for the duration of my tenure as Secretary of the Treasury, unless my participation is in
accordance with 5 C.F.R. § 2635.502(d)." Letter from Henry M. Paulson, Jr., to John F. Schorn, Deputy
Assistant Gen. Counsel & Designated Agency Ethics Official, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Re: Ethics
Agreement of Henry M. Paulson, Jr. (June 19, 2009), available at http://devel.philstockworld.com/
2009/08/1 l/the-paulson-ethics-waiver/ (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). This pledge goes well beyond
the requirements of 5 C.F.R. § 2635.502 (2009), which requires recusal from such party matters only for a
period of one year from his severance of ties with Goldman Sachs. The ethics agreement, however, does not
specifically prohibit Paulson from telephone or other contact with persons who work for Goldman Sachs. The
waiver provision, which is found in 5 C.F.R. § 2635.502(d), provides that:
Where an employee's participation in a particular matter involving specific parties would not violate
18 U.S.C. 208(a), but would raise a question in the mind of a reasonable person about his
impartiality, the agency designee may authorize the employee to participate in the matter based on a
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entering office-which precluded him from participating in particular
government matters to which Goldman Sachs was a party or represented a
party 25-and whether these contacts at least violated the spirit of the ethics
agreement, even if not its specific language.26 Paulson furthermore received two
ethics waivers, one from the White House and one from Treasury Department
ethics lawyers, which allowed him wider latitude to participate in matters
affecting Goldman Sachs. 27 The fact that a Democratic administration would take
over in January 2009, and Goldman Sachs had traditionally strong links with the
Democratic Party as well as with outgoing Secretary Paulson's Treasury
Department, fueled yet more speculation that Goldman Sachs would get its way
regardless of who was in power.
My own unsubstantiated speculation is that improper influence from
Goldman or any other bank on former employees in the government was minimal
or nonexistent. Nonetheless, the fact that there has been so much speculation
about motives in bailout decisions illustrates that existing regulation of the
revolving door does not instill public confidence that government officials will
be evenhanded. Requiring Treasury officials coming in from Goldman Sachs or
other investment banks to dump their stock in banks may not be enough when
they retain close ties to their former employers. Also, there were probably too
many senior Treasury Department officials from Goldman; perhaps there were
too many from the banking industry in general.
However, had Secretary Paulson declined to participate in bailout decisions
because of an apparent conflict with his prior position at Goldman, he would
determination, made in light of all relevant circumstances, that the interest of the Government in the
employee's participation outweighs the concern that a reasonable person may question the integrity
of the agency's programs and operations.
For cabinet officials, such authorizations and waivers are generally obtained from the White House Counsel's
Office acting on behalf of the President. On September 17, 2008, Paulson received two waivers, one waiver
from White House Counsel Fred Fielding, which allowed Paulson to participate in matters that could affect his
relatively small vested interest in a Goldman Sachs defined benefit plan-the only interest he had retained in
Goldman Sachs-and one waiver from the Treasury Department, which allowed him to participate in matters
that could affect Goldman Sachs itself. Memorandum from Fred F. Fielding, Counsel to the President, to Henry
M. Paulson, Jr., Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury (Sept. 17, 2008), available at http://www.talking
pointsmemo.com/docu ments/2009/08/ethics-waiver-re-goldman-sachs- from- fred-fielding-to-henry-paulson--sept- 17-2008.phppage= 1 (on file with the McGeorge Law Review); see Gretchen Morgenson & Don Van Natta
Jr., Paulson'sCalls to Goldman Tested Ethics During Crisis,N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2009, at A l (discussing both
waivers).
25. Goldman Sachs was not a party to the bailouts discussed at that time, but some of the bailouts, such
as that of AIG, apparently benefited Goldman Sachs.
26. See ANDREW Ross SORKIN, Too BIG TO FAIL 176-78 (2009) (recounting a "secret" meeting in June
2008-before any ethics waivers were obtained-between Paulson and Goldman's directors in Moscow that
was permitted because it was characterized as "social," although discussion topics allegedly included an
upcoming speech by Paulson and his view that the Treasury Department needed the power to wind down
troubled firms); Morgenson & Van Natta, supra note 24 (discussing multiple telephone calls between Paulson
and senior Goldman Sachs officials in September 2008).
27. I participated as the chief White House ethics lawyer in preparing Paulson's original ethics
agreement in 2006. I mention here the controversy over the agreement and the subsequent waivers but will not
interpret the agreement or opine on how it was changed by the waivers.
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have neglected his duty at a time when his involvement was most critical; the
consequences could have been disastrous. He also needed people around him
who were familiar with the source of the crisis-the banking industry. Overly
theoretical or uninformed advice from people outside the industry could have
exacerbated the crisis.
The Treasury Department General Counsel's Office, led by an experienced
securities lawyer, Robert F. Hoyt, guided Paulson and other officials through the
maze of statutes, regulations, contractual arrangements, and other criteria for
each of many financial services bailouts. These lawyers also advised on matters
of ethics. They surely considered appearances as well as the letter of the law.
Still, they had limited room to maneuver and even less time. Treasury
Department lawyers could not disable the Secretary or his staff simply because
the Department went into the crisis with senior ranks top-heavy with former
employees of Goldman and other investment banks."
Federal ethics laws have loosely regulated the movement of officials from
private employers into government. In general, federal ethics laws have only
required divestment of any financial interest in the former employer to comply
with the conflict-of-interest statute 9 and then recusal for one year from particular
party matters in which the former employer is a party.30 Waiver or authorization
by the agency for an official to proceed, despite a conflict of interest under these
rules, is permitted when it is needed for the official to perform a crucial function.
President Obama, in a January 21, 2009, Executive Order, tightened up the
rules.3' The Order requires incoming Administration appointees to sign a pledge

28. Controversy over Goldman's influence has lasted beyond the departure of Secretary Paulson. Steve
Friedman, a former chairman of Goldman, served as a senior economic adviser in the Bush White House. He
then went back into the private sector and served on Goldman's board of directors while serving the
Administration as a special government employee (SGE) in a variety of capacities. He has remained a director
of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York during the Obama Administration. Friedman also allegedly
purchased Goldman stock in December 2008 and January 2009. Friedman resigned his Fed post in May 2009,
presumably because of the conflict. See Jon Hilsenrath & Kate Kelly, Chairman of N.Y. Fed Quits Amid
Questions, WALL ST. J., May 8, 2009, at A-1.
29. See 18 U.S.C. § 208 (2006). The head of an agency is permitted to waive this prohibition after
consultation with the Office of Government Ethics (OGE). Id. § 208(b).
30. This does not include party matters in which the former employer is not a party, even if the matter
has an effect on the former employer. See 5 C.F.R. § 2635.502 (2002) (requiring recusal from particular matters
involving specific parties if those parties include former employers within the past year and other persons with
whom the government employee has a "covered relationship"). An agency-designated ethics official can grant
an authorization for an agency employee to participate in such a matter if the need for the official to participate
outweighs the appearance of impropriety. This rule does not cover matters, such as regulation of an entire
industry, that do not have specific identifiable parties.
31. Exec. Order No. 13,490, 74 Fed. Reg. 4673 (Jan. 21, 2009).
32. Appointee is defined in section (2)(b) of the order:
"Appointee" shall include every full-time, non-career Presidential or Vice-Presidential appointee,
non-career appointee in the Senior Executive Service (or other SES-type system), and appointee to a
position that has been excepted from the competitive service by reason of being of a confidential or
policymaking character (Schedule C and other positions excepted under comparable criteria) in an
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that, for two years, they will not work on particular matters involving specific
parties, including regulations and contracts that are "directly and substantially"
related to their former clients or employers.33 Presumably this includes most
bailout packages that directly and substantially benefit former clients or
employers. The Order imposes even stricter rules on incoming appointees who
are registered lobbyists. 4 The Order recognizes that the revolving door into
government is a serious problem and at least attempts to deal with it.35
There could, however, be problems with implementation of the Order. This is
a difficult area to regulate because so many senior government officials come in
from the private sector. If restrictions are too onerous, people from the private
sector will not agree to serve. As President Kennedy said in calling for revision
of ethics laws in 1961:
Such regulation, while setting the highest moral standards, must not
impair the ability of the Government to recruit personnel of the highest
quality and capacity. Today's Government needs men and women with a
broad range of experience, knowledge, and ability. It needs increasing
numbers of people with topflight executive talent. It needs hundreds of
occasional and intermittent consultants and part-time experts to help deal
with problems of increasing complexity and technical difficulty. In short,
we need to draw upon America's entire reservoir of talent and skill to

executive agency. It does not include any person appointed as a member of the Senior Foreign
Service or solely as a uniformed service commissioned officer.
Id.
33. Paragraph 2 of the pledge reads:
Revolving Door Ban-All Appointees Entering Government. I will not for a period of 2 years from
the date of my appointment participate in any particular matter involving specific parties that is
directly and substantially related to my former employer or former clients, including regulations and
contracts.
Id. Particular matters involving specific parties are usually thought to include contracts, investigations, lawsuits,
and other matters with identifiable parties, but not government regulations that affect an entire industry. The
specific reference to "regulation" in this Executive Order, however, implies that its reach could be considerably
broader.
34. Paragraph 3 of the pledge reads:
Revolving Door Ban-Lobbyists Entering Government. If I was a registered lobbyist within the 2
years before the date of my appointment, in addition to abiding by the limitations of paragraph 2, I
will not for a period of 2 years after the date of my appointment: (a) participate in any particular
matter on which I lobbied within the 2 years before the date of my appointment; (b) participate in the
specific issue area in which that particular matter falls; or (c) seek or accept employment with any
executive agency that I lobbied within the 2 years before the date of my appointment.
Id.
35. The Order has been generally quite favorably received by commentators. Dennis Thompson, for
example, has commentated favorably on the objectives of the Executive Order, while recognizing that the
Administration thus far still lacks a coordinated approach to the broader range of ethics problems in government
that are not addressed in the Order. See Dennis F. Thompson, Obama's Ethics Agenda: The Challenge of
CoordinatedChange, 7 THE FORUM, Art. 8 (2009), http://www.bepress.conforumvol7/iss 1/art8/ (on file with
the McGeorge Law Review).
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help conduct our generation's most important business-the public
business.36

President Obama faces this problem as well. Indeed, there is already
controversy over how many waivers from the Executive Order will be granted
and whether agency lawyers will interpret the Order narrowly to require recusals
from some matters but not others.3 7 If too many waivers are granted or the Order
is interpreted too narrowly, its purpose will be compromised; the Order will bring
little or no improvement in public confidence that bailout decisions are immune
from influence by the banks from which many government officials came.
D. The Revolving Door out of Government
Federal ethics laws, including criminal statutes, have regulated the movement
of government officials into the private sector for a long time. These statutes,
however, are narrow in scope.3" Government officials who arrange bailouts for
companies get to know senior executives of these companies in the process.
Subsequent employment by those companies can be perceived to be, and
sometimes might actually be, a "reward" for the bailout.
A criminal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 208, prohibits a government official from
participating personally and substantially in a government matter that has a direct
and predictable impact on an entity with which the official is negotiating for
employment. These rules, like many ethics rules, however, are easy to evade.
Consider the following hypothetical conversation:
Treasury Official: "You said you need some bailout money. Is $20
billion really enough? Don't you think you need 30?"
Investment Bank CEO: "I'll take 30, although $40 billion would be
better. You really ought to work for us someday when you finish at
Treasury; I know just the position we could give you."
Treasury Official: "My ethics lawyer told me I can't talk to you about
that, at least if I am going to participate personally and substantially in
this particular matter, which is to give you the $50 billion, or whatever it
is you need."

36. Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 166-67 (1990) (citing Message from the President of the
United States Relative to Ethical Conduct in the Government, H.R. Doc. No. 145, at 2 (1961)).
37. Senator Chuck Grassley (R-IA) has demanded disclosure of waivers and recusals under the
Executive Order. See Kenneth P. Vogel, Grassley After W.H. Ethics Waivers, POLITICO, June 10, 2009,
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0609/23612.html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
38. The prospect of a private sector job, for example, does not create a conflict barring an official from
working on government matters affecting a prospective private sector employer unless and until there are actual
employment negotiations. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 208 (2006).
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Investment Bank CEO: "I understand. All I really meant to say is that we
have a lot of talented people like yourself around our firm and that we
want to keep them and hire some more. Speaking of keeping the people
we have, I hope the money you are talking about does not come with
strings attached that would affect our bonus program."
Treasury Official: "Of course not. We will make sure the bill Congress
passes has a provision that would protect our-excuse me I mean yourcompensation arrangements."
This hypothetical conversation is exaggerated, but it would still be difficult
to prosecute under section 208. The Treasury official could argue-probably to
the point of showing a reasonable doubt-that he had rebuffed the investment
bank's attempt to enter into employment negotiations. If there were no
employment negotiations, he would be free under the statute to participate in
government matters affecting the bank, even a bailout worth billions of dollars.
A different problem arises when a company anticipates a need for a bailout
and hires officials away from government agencies, expecting them to use
government contacts to arrange the bailout. Once again, there is a criminal
conflict-of-interest statute, 18 U.S.C. § 207(a), which prohibits government
officials from ever representing back to the government on the same particular
party matters that they worked on while in government. Subsections 207(c) and
(d) prohibit "senior"3 9 government officials from representing back to their
agencies for one year on any matters, regardless of whether they worked on those
matters, and "very senior" 4 officials from doing so for two years (the ban for
,'very senior" officials also includes representing back to senior government
officials in other agencies).
These provisions of section 207, like those in section 208, have limited reach.
For example, a Treasury Department official who is not "senior" or "very senior"
can, immediately after leaving Treasury, lobby back to Treasury on any matter
other than a particular bailout involving identifiable parties that the official
worked on while at Treasury. A bailout of a different company generally would
not come under the prohibition. This would probably be so even if the bailout
money comes from the same package of allocated funds, unless the bailout
package for a particular industry as a whole could be characterized as a single

39. See 18 U.S.C. § 207(c)(2) (2006) (defining "senior" government employees based on pay grade).
The pay threshold is $148,953 for 2008. Memorandum from Don W. Fox, Gen. Counsel, OGE, to Designated
Agency Ethics Officials, Recent Legislative Activity Affecting the Executive Branch Ethics Program, at 3
(Nov. 6, 2008), available at http://www.usoge.gov/ethics-guidance/daeograms/dgrfiles/2008/doO8037.pdf (on
file with the McGeorge Law Review). Certain other employees, who may earn less than this amount, including
Deputy Assistants to the President in the White House, also are considered to be "senior."
40. See 18 U.S.C. § 207(d) (defining "very senior" government employees). This category includes,
among others, agency heads and Assistants to the President in the White House.
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"particular party matter" having many different parties. 4' Such a broad definition
of a particular party matter is unlikely to withstand scrutiny in a criminal case
under section 207(a); each separate firm bailout, or at least each group of bailouts
implemented simultaneously, is most likely to be viewed as its own particular
party matter. A former Treasury official who worked on such a matter or group
of matters can represent back to the government on other matters, even those that
are substantially similar. The only caveat is that, because OGE's rules under
section 207(a) are confusing, when two bailouts or other particular party matters
are closely related, a former official should avoid defining too narrowly the scope
41
of the particular party matters he worked on while in government service.
The post-employment prohibition for "senior" officials is broader because it
also includes representation to the former agency on any matter for one year. It
does not, however, include representation to other agencies where bailout
decisions are likely to be made; for example, a former Treasury Department
senior official can lobby the White House Council of Economic Advisers and the
Federal Reserve. The prohibition on former "very senior" officials lasts for two
years and covers representations back to "senior" officials at these other
agencies. Still, evasion is relatively easy. A former "very senior" official can
propose the terms of a bailout in a public forum, and in private communications
with members of Congress, without violating the statute. Others in his or her
organization can handle direct negotiations with the relevant executive branch
agencies that are covered by the statute. People in these agencies will know what
the former official wants and, given his prior "very senior" position in an agency,
may give his proposals considerable deference.
Furthermore, when section 207 is violated, the consequences may not be a
sufficient deterrent. While this is a criminal statute and the Department of Justice
43
prosecutes some violations, penalties are not always particularly severe.

41. Some Office of Government Ethics (OGE) interpretive letters predating the bailouts have addressed
this general issue without resolving it. Two matters, such as two federal contracts that are part of a single
umbrella contract or contracting program, in most circumstances are still separate "particular matters involving
specific parties," but in some circumstances they could be seen as a single matter; thus, a former employee who
worked on one is barred from representing back to the government with respect to them all. Also, two
previously separate matters could later converge into a single particular matter involving specific parties, as
OGE suggested in a 2002 opinion involving the Yucca Mountain project. See Letter from Office of Gov't
Ethics, to Dep't of Energy & Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n Ethics Officials, at 10 (July 31, 2002) (on file with
the McGeorge Law Review).
42. OGE has sought to clarify some of these issues in new rules interpreting section 207(a) that were
proposed in 2003, revised, and then issued as final rules in June 2008. Post-Employment Conflict of Interest
Restrictions, 73 Fed. Reg. 36,168 (June 25, 2008) (to be codified at 5 C.F.R. pts. 2637 & 2641). The new rules,
however, only respond to some concerns raised in the comment period about ambiguity. The final rules also, in
some ways, create further potential for overbroad interpretation of the statute. For example, OGE distinguishes
the convergence theory in the Yucca Mountain letter based on "a very unique set of circumstances" in that case,
but there is little helpful guidance for identifying or distinguishing analogous circumstances in the future. See
id. at 36,177.
43. Richard Holbrooke, for example, served the Clinton Administration in several top diplomatic posts
before leaving to go into investment banking. The Department of Justice Public Integrity Division later charged
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The revolving door out of government is another area where President
Obama has sought to tighten up ethics rules in his January 2009 Executive Order,
principally by lengthening the restriction on post-employment "representing
back" from one year to two years." Administration appointees who leave to
lobby must promise not to lobby other Administration appointees for the
remainder of the Administration.4 ' The difficulty with the Order's approach,
however, is that a pledge of this sort is difficult to enforce vis-ei-vis former
Administration officials who lobby from the outside. It lacks the teeth of 18
U.S.C. § 207, which, although narrower in scope, is a criminal statute.
Concerns regarding the revolving door out of government and inadequate
restrictions are particularly acute in bailouts, given the amounts of money
involved and the discretion government officials have in determining how to use
it. Companies sometimes want bailout money badly, particularly if there are
relatively few strings attached. Many government officials who contemplate
rejoining the private sector are high-ranking political appointees. The more
discretion these officials have over expenditures due to a lack of predefined
parameters, the more likely factors such as post-government employment will
influence decisions.
Nonetheless, the corrupting influence from private employment prospects is
difficult to mitigate with regulation. Post-employment restrictions that are too
onerous may discourage qualified people from entering government to begin
with. Current conflict-of-interest rules for government officials who negotiate for
jobs with the private sector and former officials representing back to the

that he violated post-employment conflict-of-interest rules by representing back to the State Department on
behalf of an investment bank. As is often the case, the charges were settled with payment of a $5,000 fine. See
Memorandum from Stephen D. Potts, Dir., OGE, to Designated Agency Ethics Officials & Inspectors Gen.,
1999 Conflict of Interest Prosecution Survey to Designated Agency Ethics Officials and Inspectors General
DO-00-029 (Aug. 14, 2000), available at http://www.cs.indiana.eduisudoc/image_32000000478091/320000
0047809 I/DAEOGRAM/00/DoOO029.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Low Review).
Holbrooke continued to have an influential career in finance (he was a director of AIG from 2001 until
2008), and he most recently served as the President's liaison to Afghanistan. Holbrooke is a talented diplomat
and the violation was probably a consequence of carelessness rather than intent. The fact that he later survived
the vetting process for appointment to other prominent posts, however, suggests that violations of postemployment restrictions are not viewed too seriously (failure to pay a "nanny tax" or a sex scandal perhaps
would have been more problematic).
44. Paragraph 4 of the pledge required under the Order states:
Revolving Door Ban-Appointees Leaving Government. If, upon my departure from the
Government, I am covered by the post-employment restrictions on communicating with employees
of my former executive agency set forth in section 207(c) of title 18, United States Code, I agree that
I will abide by those restrictions for a period of 2 years following the end of my appointment.
Exec. Order No. 13,490, 74 Fed. Reg. 4673 (Jan. 21, 2009).
45. Paragraph 5 of the pledge reads:
Revolving Door Ban-Appointees Leaving Government to Lobby. In addition to abiding by the
limitations of paragraph 4, I also agree, upon leaving Government service, not to lobby any covered
executive branch official or non-career Senior Executive Service appointee for the remainder of the
Administration.
Id.
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government, however, permit many situations where post-employment job
prospects and post-employment lobbying could unduly influence government
decisions. Ethics rules that purport to accomplish a great deal but actually
prohibit relatively little may be counterproductive if the press and the public are
lured into complacency regarding conflicts of interest.
E. Insider Trading
Insider trading on government bailout information goes back to the founding
of the Treasury Department in 1789. Alexander Hamilton's economic plan
contemplated paying off both federal revolutionary war debt at one hundred
percent of par and assuming debt obligations of the individual states also at one
hundred percent of par. The assumption of state debt consisted of a bailout of
states, such as Massachusetts, that had incurred large amounts of debt. The
bailout had strong justification to the extent the debt had been incurred by the
states to pay for a war which allowed the country to come into being, but it was a
bailout nonetheless. Hamilton's plan passed Congress in part because of a deal
with the Virginia delegation to move the capitol to Washington. "Hamilton
eventually persuaded Congress to pay off these obligations at 100 percent of face
value, even though many of them were trading at less than half of face value and
had passed from original purchasers-often farmers and war veterans-into the
hands of speculators. 46 Arguably it was the speculators, not the states, that were
being bailed out.
The deal was preceded by massive insider trading in federal and state
government bonds and by allegations that Hamilton's allies had financial
conflicts of interest. Members of Congress and of the Washington Administration
were among the speculators who were trading in federal and state bonds based on
advance knowledge of the Treasury's intent to pay off the bonds (there was little
evidence that Hamilton himself was profiting directly from these trades, but his
friends apparently were). "According to Senator William Maclay, Democrat of
Pennsylvania, speculators sent stage coaches all over the South and West buying
up federal and state notes at fractions of their face value. 47 Maclay and his
Jeffersonian allies were furious.
Democrats in Congress lacked the votes to block Hamilton from becoming
Secretary of the Treasury, but Congress did enact a law that prohibited, and still

46. PAINTER, supra note 1,at 164.
47. Id.; see JOURNAL OF WILLIAM MACLAY: UNITED STATES SENATOR FROM PENNSYLVANIA 17891791, at 174-75 (Edgar S. Maclay ed., D. Appleton & Co. 1890) (1789); see also Richard W. Painter, University
of Chicago Fulton Lecture, May 11, 2006: Ethics and Corruption in Business and Government: Lessons fron
the South Sea Bubble and the Bank of the United States (U. Minn. Law Sch. Legal Studies Research Paper, No.

06-32), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=920912. "These crooked dealings in
government bonds increased Jeffersonian Democrats' hostility to the rest of Hamilton's economic plan, hostility
which culminated in Congress allowing the charter for the First Bank of the United States to lapse in 1808."
PAINTER, supra note 1,
at 164 n.24 1.
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prohibits, the Secretary of the Treasury from being "concerned" in the purchase
or sale of federal or state government bonds while in office. 48 A new Secretary of
the Treasury must therefore decide how much money to invest in federal and
state bonds before taking office. The Secretary may not increase or decrease
these investments during his or her term in office.
In more recent times, government information about new regulation,
enforcement actions, and contracts is often relevant to stock values for particular
companies or entire industries. Exactly how often this information is used for
insider trading is unclear. It is troubling, however, that some lawyers at the SEC
itself may have traded on inside information about enforcement actions 49 Trading
also does not have to directly involve government officials themselves to be
illegal; "tipping" of nonpublic information by government officials to others who
trade is just as illegal and probably more frequent (because securities trades by
senior government officials and their immediate family members are publicly
reported on financial disclosure Form 278, there is an incentive to avoid
suspicious trading in their own accounts). Government officials might "tip"
information to others in return for political favors, future employment prospects,
or even cash.
"An increasing number of financial services firms, including hedge funds,
are [headquartered] in or around Washington"50 and seek access to government
officials in order to get information. Executive branch officials' participation in
campaign fundraisers and private "briefings" for campaign contributors creates
an ideal venue for leaking inside information, as do the many social events in
Washington. Meanwhile, government agencies have weak prophylactic measures
to prevent insider trading on government information compared with the more
robust restrictions implemented in law firms, investment banks, and many
corporations. Apart from strict rules protecting classified information and
prohibitions on disclosure of some information relevant to government contracts,

48. 31 U.S.C. § 329(a) (2006).
(1) The Secretary of the Treasury and the Treasurer may not-(A) be involved in trade or commerce;
(B) own any part of a vessel (except a pleasure vessel); (C) buy or hold as a beneficiary in trust
public property; (D) be involved in buying or disposing of obligations of a State or the United States
Government; and (E) personally take or use a benefit gained from conducting business of the
Department of the Treasury except as authorized by law. (2) An officer violating this subsection
shall be fined $3,000, removed from office, and thereafter may not hold an office of the
Government.
Id. This provision is derived from the Treasury Act of 1789, ch. 12, sec. 8, which provides that "no person
appointed to any office instituted by this act, shall directly or indirectly be concerned or interested in carrying
on the business of trade or commerce, or be owner in whole or in part of any sea-vessel, or purchase by himself,
or another in trust for him, any public lands or other public property, or be concerned in the purchase or disposal
of any public securities of any State, or of the United States." Id.
49. See Bernie Becker, Insider Trading Inquiry Cites Lawyers at S.E.C., N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 2009, at
B3.
50. PAINTER, supra note 1,
at 167.
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there are few restrictions in government on dissemination of nonpublic
information by government employees.
When a government decision-such as a bailout-dramatically affects the
price of stock or debt securities of a particular company, and possibly its
competitors, the risk of insider trading is even more pronounced. Stock in
troubled companies may trade at very low prices, perhaps less than $1 per share,
and debt securities also are usually deeply discounted. An announcement of a
bailout that provides any hope to equity holders could lead to a sharp increase in
the stock price; an announcement of a creditor bailout could have a dramatic
effect on the debt securities; an announcement of a bailout that sacrifices
stockholders and creditors in favor of other constituencies, such as labor, could
have the opposite effect. The specifics of a bailout package are critical to
knowing which security-holders will win or lose. Government officials will be
tempted to leak this information in advance to people who want it, particularly if
there is something personal or political to gain in return. The practice is difficult
to regulate, because it is often difficult to distinguish between illegitimate leaks
of government information and legitimate communication with constituents
affected by government decisions. If, for example, the government is going to
help labor at the expense of bondholders in a particular bailout, should
government officials be permitted to tell allies in organized labor this information
before it is disclosed to securities markets? If so, labor leaders and the investment
funds they control have the potential to gain a lot more than preferential
treatment in the bailout.
The threat of prison sentences for insider trading will deter some potential
abusers of the government's confidence. 5 Nonetheless, insider trading can be
difficult to detect and hard to prosecute, particularly if multiple "tippers" and
"tippees" are involved.
Insider trading and other abuses of inside information in bailouts are other
areas that could be elucidated by an empirical study. Event studies have analyzed
stock price fluctuations in the days leading up to a tender offer announcement.
However, event studies that focus instead on bailout announcements could
provide considerable insight into whether leaks of government information and
insider trading are a serious problem.
F. Abuses by Government Contractors
Private firms are asked to help structure bailout transactions, value assets
acquired by the government in bailouts, manage these assets for the government,

51. Abuses of government information that involve trading in securities markets are generally prohibited
by criminal statutes and Securities Exchange Commission rules thereunder. The law of insider trading,
however, can be confusing and, in some cases, difficult to prosecute. See Richard W. Painter, Kimberly D.
Krawiec & Cynthia A. Williams, Don't Ask, Just Tell: Insider Trading After United States v. O'Hagan, 84 VA.
L. REv. 153 (1998).
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help the government dispose of these assets, and perform other needed functions.
These firms often learn critical information before markets do, including which
companies will get bailed out, which investors will receive how much, which
assets the government will acquire, and how and when the government will
dispose of those assets. Most of these firms have other businesses, such as
providing money management and investment advice, and some also trade for
their customers' and their own accounts.
Misappropriation of government information is only one of the many
potential conflicts of interest that can arise when private contractors are involved
in government bailouts of private companies. There is also the risk that
contracting firms may structure government transactions, or advise the
government, in ways that are more helpful to their own interests or private
clients' interests than the public interest. 52
As I discuss more generally in my book, outsourcing government functions
to the private sector means outsourcing decisions regarding ethics to contract
personnel who, unlike government employees, are not bound by government
ethics rules and often are not subject to government supervision.53 For bailouts,
however, outsourcing is probably unavoidable, because the government is
venturing into unfamiliar areas that require specialized private-sector expertise.
In financial services bailouts, in particular, the government can acquire
derivatives portfolios and other financial assets that are hard to manage and even
harder to discard. Private firms with experience in the field may be required.
Individuals also sometimes work for the government as contractors. As
pointed out above in the discussion of the revolving door into government, some
of the Treasury Department's advisors on financial services bailouts have been
brought in as contractors. As such, they may work in Treasury Department office
space, meet frequently with Treasury officials, be entrusted with government
information, and be asked for advice on particular bailouts. They are not,
however, bound by conflict-of-interest and other ethics rules imposed on
government employees. If they come from Goldman Sachs, they may still retain
their holdings in Goldman Sachs-and consult with Goldman Sachs-while
working on bailouts that affect Goldman Sachs.

52. Much of the scrutiny thus far has focused on one firm, BlackRock, which the Federal Reserve hired
to perform a range of functions, including management of assets acquired from Bear Steams, AIG, and other
troubled institutions. Senator Charles Grassley (R-IA) observed that BlackRock "[has] access to information
when the Federal Reserve will try to sell securities, and what price they will accept. And [it has] intricate
financial relations with people across the globe .... The potential for a conflict of interest is great and it is just
very difficult to police." Eric Lipton & Michael J. de la Merced, Wall St. Firm Draws Scrutiny as U.S. Adviser,
N.Y. TtMES, May 19, 2009, at Al. Meanwhile the Treasury Department is expected to announce winning
bidders for assistance with the $1 trillion plan to buy troubled assets from banks, and BlackRock is expected to
win one of the contracts. Id.
53. See PAINTER, supra note 1, at 99-120.
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While the government has recently sought to assert more control over the
ethics of its contractors, there is a long way to go.54 Most of the government's
experience in overseeing contractors has been in areas such as defense55 and
scientific research 6 Complex financial transactions and asset management are
relatively new areas for government outsourcing to private firms, thus the
government has less experience dealing with the types of conflict of interest
likely to arise.
III. REMEDIES FOR CONFLICTS OF INTEREST AND ETHICS
PROBLEMS IN BAILOUTS

The principal purpose of this Essay is to point out particular problems with
government bailouts of private industry that generally fall under the heading of
"government ethics." Detailed solutions will not be proposed here. However,
below I discuss a few general approaches to these problems and the potential
advantages and disadvantages of each.
One approach would be to tighten up ethics rules for government officials
who are involved in bailouts. There are a number of ways this could be done,
although it is unclear how much improvement can result from more stringent
ethics rules.
Officials involved in bailouts could be barred under Hatch Act regulations
from participating in a broad range of "personal capacity" political activity,
including partisan fundraisers and campaign events. Similar restrictions currently
apply to government officials working in intelligence and national-securityrelated fields, where independence from politics is deemed to be particularly
important. Compared with the lenient rules that apply to government officials
generally, these more restrictive rules make officials less directly accessible to
political operatives and campaign contributors. Given the enormous magnitude of
federal bailouts and the discretionary decision-making in bailouts, this is another
policy area that should be separated from politics as much as possible. Although
political influence can always be exerted indirectly on government decisionmakers, political influence is not likely to be as potent or as blatant if additional
Hatch Act restrictions are imposed.
54. Id. at 111-17. The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR)-codified at Title 48 of the Code of Federal
Regulations--contains uniform policies and procedures for government contractors, including a requirement that
certain contractors have a written code of business ethics and conduct. See 40 C.F.R. § 3.104 (2008).
55. The General Accounting Office (GAO) audited contracting by a wide range of Department of
Defense (DOD) agencies and then issued a report in March 2008 on financial conflict-of-interest problems
among DOD contractors. See GAO, DEFENSE CONTRACTING: ADDITIONAL PERSONAL CONFLICT OF INTEREST
SAFEGUARDS NEEDED FOR CERTAIN DOD CONTRACTOR EMPLOYEES (2008), availableat http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/d08l69.pdf. DOD entered into more than $151 billion in service contracts in 2006. Id. at 5.
56. The National Institute of Health (NIH) has a conflict-of-interest policy for grant recipients embodied
in Department of Health and Human Services regulations concerning federal financial conflict of interest
(FCOI) in research pertaining to NIH grants and cooperative agreements. See 42 C.F.R. § 50.601-.607
(2008).
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The revolving door "in" could be addressed, in part, by imposing quotas on
the number of senior officials entering an agency from a single private sector
employer. A Treasury Secretary from a large financial institution should recruit
all or most of his senior staff from elsewhere. Also, the most senior positions in
the Treasury Department, including deputy secretaries and assistant secretaries,
are not appointees of the Secretary, but appointees of the President who are
confirmed by the Senate. The Secretary often makes recommendations and the
President sometimes defers to the Secretary on these nominations. The President,
however, should not agree to nominate any other person coming in from the same
bank as the Secretary and should also avoid nominating more than one or perhaps
two Treasury officials coming in from any other bank.
The revolving door "out" could be tightened somewhat by barring officials
leaving government jobs from receiving compensation for one or two years from
a private sector employer that received a bailout they worked on while in
government service.57 Congress could also specifically provide that bailouts that
are part of a package for the same industry are all the "same particular matter"
involving specific parties for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 207(a), so a former
government official who participated in one bailout could not represent back to
the government with respect to any of the other bailouts in the package.
These and other new rules might help reduce conflicts of interest, but the
stricter rules could also discourage government service in areas that sorely need
private sector expertise. Also, like existing ethics rules, these new rules might be
easy to evade.
A second approach would be to have government decision-makers who are
less prone to conflicts of interest and other ethics problems. Bailout decisions
could be taken from the hands of political appointees and given to career
government officials who are less likely to enter the private sector in the near
future.
Bailouts are common in the type of industrial policy used by some European
countries, but bailouts were not prevalent in the United States until recently.
American-style political appointments and the American-style "revolving door"
in and out of government may be inconsistent with an industrial policy that picks

57. Similar rules currently apply to some government procurement officials. Under the Procurement
Integrity Act, 41 U.S.C. § 423 (2008), a government employee who serves in certain capacities in the conduct
of a procurement action or contract in excess of $10 million is prohibited for one year from receiving
compensation as an employee or consultant for the same contractor (an exception allows the former employee
to receive compensation from another division of the contracting company if that division does not produce the
same or similar products or services as those provided to the government in the contract). See 41 U.S.C. § 423;
Federal Acquisition Regulation, 48 C.F.R. § 3.104 (2008). The one-year ban applies to government employees
who serve in the following capacities on a contract over $10 million: procuring contracting officer, source
selection authority, member of the source selection evaluation board, chief of a financial or technical evaluation
team, program manager, deputy program manager, or administrative contracting officer. 41 U.S.C. § 423. The
ban also applies to government employees who make certain key decisions, such as awarding a contract or
subcontract over $10 million, awarding a modification of the contract, placing a delivery order under the
contract, and paying or settling a claim on the contract. Id.
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winners and losers in the private sector and where the government owns portions
of private companies. A civil service like that of France may be better suitedfrom an ethics vantage point, at least-than ours for making bailout decisions.
These and similar solutions, however, risk making improvements in ethics at
the expense of expertise. Officials investing government money may know little
about the private sector if they have never worked there. Conflicts of interest may
exist, but bailout decisions could be ill-informed.
Yet a third approach would be to systematize the bailout process itself.
Congress could set up a "bailout board" with standing to review bailouts before
they are implemented. Career government officials could sit on the board, as
could, perhaps, some private sector persons. If such persons were full-time
government employees or part-time special government employees (SGEs), not
contractors, they would be subject to government conflict-of-interest rules.58 One
disadvantage of such a board, however, is that the board structure can be
cumbersome and may not be able to react quickly to the pressing timeline that
most bailouts require. Furthermore, a bailout board that involved SGEs with
private sector entanglements could make ethics problems-including the risk of
insider trading-worse, not better.
A variation on this approach would be to reduce the discretionary component
of bailout decisions by setting up a federal apparatus for all industrial bailouts
similar to the FDIC apparatus for banks. If this system is used as a model, should
all private enterprises that are "too big to fail" pay bailout insurance premiums
and be monitored for safety and soundness? Should bondholders be subject to a
predetermined principal loss in the event of a bailout? While such a prearranged
system creates more certainty regarding bailouts and may alleviate ethics
concerns, having such a "universal industrial insurance" system creates more
moral hazard for corporate managers (e.g., incentive to run private enterprises in
a risky manner).
Indeed, any approach that relies on making bailout decisions less arbitrary
and more predictable creates a dilemma for policymakers. While government
ethics problems can be mitigated by narrowing government discretion, these
gains could be offset when moral hazard problems undermine business ethics. If
firms can receive a government bailout according to a prearranged script, even if
they are not managed according to a government-imposed risk control script,
firm managers may manage risk as if a portion of the risk is borne by the
government. Personal and institutional responsibility in the private sector would
erode further than they already have. Government could respond to the moral
hazard problem by imposing risk management regulation on firms that receive
bailouts. Doing so across a wide spectrum of firms ranging from investment
banks to car companies, however, would involve a fundamental alteration in

58. Compliance with these rules would have to be carefully monitored if SGEs were to serve on a
bailout board, because SGEs often have significant private sector entanglements.
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government's relationship with business. In short, systematizing the bailout
process to reduce arbitrariness of government decision-making may not be a
practical endeavor. Improved chances of ethical behavior by government
employees may be more than offset by moral hazards for managers of firms that
receive bailouts.
Whichever of these approaches-or combination of approaches-is taken to
address government ethics and bailouts, a crucial ingredient is transparency. The
public should know how bailout money is being used and who is receiving it. In a
recent Freedom of Information Act suit, a federal judge ordered the Federal
Reserve to disclose to Bloomberg News the names of companies in its
emergency lending programs and information about the collateral-mostly
mortgage backed securities-that was used to back the loans.59 The Judge
rejected as speculative the Federal Reserve's argument that disclosure could
create a downward spiral of financial instability for participating institutions.
Such conjecture, without a showing of imminent harm, failed to meet the Federal
Reserve's burden of justifying its refusal to release the information. A few weeks
later, a Treasury Department Inspector General's report alleged that senior
Treasury officials affirmatively misled the public in statements about the health
of large banks receiving government assistance in the Troubled Asset Relief
Program (TARP). 60
Disclosure is a cornerstone of government ethics law, as well as of federal
securities law. Federal employees earning over a certain salary or holding jobs
above a certain level of seniority are required to disclose their financial assets
and financial transactions on Form 278. Shareholders in public companies have
access to annual reports, including audited financial statements, as well as
quarterly reports. When a public company makes a substantial investment in
another company, shareholders are entitled to find out about it. When
government money is used for loans to troubled companies, or in buying assets
from those companies, a similar rationale justifies disclosure to the public.
Eventually, it is the public that will bear the profit or loss incurred from the
investment.
Disclosure, however, will only go so far, particularly if disclosure is only
provided after bailout decisions are already made (also, the later disclosure
occurs in the decision-making process, the greater the risk of insider trading and
other inappropriate uses of government information may be). Disclosure may
give Bloomberg News and other journalists more to write about, but it is not
59. Bloomberg, L.P. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve System, No. 08-CV-9595, 2009 WL
2599336 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 24, 2009). The Federal Reserve appealed the order on September 30, 2009. See Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Pending Cases Involving the Board of Governors,
http://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/legaldevelopmentscases.htm (last visited Oct. 6, 2009) (on file with
the McGeorge Law Review).
60. See OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GEN. FOR THE TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM,
QUARTERLY REPORT TO CONGRESS 18 (Oct. 21, 2009), available at http://www.sigtarp.gov/reports/congress/
2009/October2009_Quarterly.ReporttoCongress.pdf.
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clear what, if anything, the public will do with that information. Disclosure of
information about campaign contributions, for example, has done little to dampen
enthusiasm for contributing or for implicit quid pro quo arrangements between
government officials and their contributors. Also, if the public approaches
disclosure about bailouts as a fate accompli-as a reason for being cynical but
not for taking concrete action--disclosure may do little to change behavior of
government officials or the companies they bail out.
For all of these reasons, the best approach to this problem is probably to have
fewer government bailouts or none at all. Conflicts of interest and other ethics
problems in bailouts are very difficult to solve, regardless of the type of system
used to administer bailouts. Some solutions to these ethics problems could have
even greater economic cost than the problems themselves. Avoiding bailouts may
be the most cost effective approach from an ethics vantage point as well as from
that of economic policy.
The government, perhaps, should not allow most businesses to get so large
that they are "too big to fail." "Bigness" may need to be considered as a factor in
antitrust law regardless of whether it is directly tied to monopolistic pricing or
other abuse of market power. Mergers resulting in financial services
conglomerates as large as Citibank are questionable if taxpayers must pick up the
tab when the conglomerates fail.
When businesses are allowed to get "too big to fail," there perhaps should be
some regulation for safety and soundness. Corporate law could do its part by
imposing on managers a fiduciary obligation to look after the interests of debtholders as well as shareholders, particularly when leverage reaches certain levels.
Manager compensation packages could be designed to discourage rather than
encourage excessive risk-taking. Executives earning extraordinary compensation,
i.e., more than $3 million per year, should perhaps, for purposes of personal
liability to creditors of the company that employs them, be treated as partners or
joint venturers with the company, even if that company is itself a corporation or
other limited liability entity; such a liability rule would bring back some of the
reduced moral hazard associated with the partnership form used by many
investment banks before the 1980s. 6' The advantages and disadvantages of such
proposals are beyond the scope of this paper, but some of these proposals may be
cheaper alternatives to the prevailing practice of vacillating between a laissez
faire approach to business risk and the more aggressive approach to using
government bailouts when risks do not pan out.

61.

lam currently working on such a proposal with Professor Claire Hill, also of the Minnesota faculty.
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IV. CONCLUSION
This Essay raises more questions than it provides answers, and it is intended
to be that way. As discussion of this issue continues, commentators will
hopefully develop more concrete proposals.
More general prescriptions, such as those set forth in my recent book on
government ethics-many of which focus on the lobbying industry and campaign
finance reform-may be insufficient to address conflicts of interest and other
government ethics problems in bailouts. These problems are most salient when
government officials move in and out of the private sector and also direct trillions
of dollars to particular companies. The magnitude of these problems is difficult
to measure, although empirical work in some areas, including insider trading,
might be informative. My early assessment is that there are significant
government ethics problems with bailouts. Given the amount of money involved
and the potentially adverse impact on financial markets of any problem that
increases the arbitrariness of government decision-making, the economic impact
of ethics problems in bailouts is probably substantial.
There is also a risk that the government makes mistakes and then tries to fix
the situation by throwing good money after bad. Some bailouts will not work,
and the government will lose money. Conflicts of interest and other ethics
problems will arise in association with some of these failed bailouts. Rather than
admit errors in judgment and recover what the government can, government
officials may invest yet more money in the irrational hope of turning around a
bailout gone wrong. Psychological studies show that persons in a "loss frame"
often make risk-preferring decisions in order to avoid a loss, even if the risks
they take are irrational.62 Casinos understand that gamblers down on their luck
will likely take irrational risks to extract themselves from a loss. Government
decision-makers, who are gambling with taxpayers' money in bailouts, are
probably also prone to the same risk-preferring behavior. If their own business
judgment or ethical conduct could be questioned when a bailout goes wrong,
government officials may be even more prone to cover things up with an infusion
of yet more government money. 63
Unfortunately, as also discussed above, my initial impression is that some, if
not most, solutions to government ethics problems in bailouts may be more
costly than their corresponding benefits. The best alternative may be a bailoutfree economy, at least for the vast majority of industry sectors where the
government does not regulate or monitor risk management.
Creating an economic system that does not need bailouts is a challenge for
economic policymakers, not government ethics advisors. This challenge
involves, among other things, aligning the incentives of economic actors with the

62.

See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47
263 (1979).
See PAINTER, supra note 1, at 282 (discussing "The Psychology of the Cover-up").
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consequences of their actions. In some instances, better and more consistently
enforced regulation may be appropriate; in other instances, the optimal solution
may be less regulation and a clearer message that people must bear the
consequences of their actions. An intelligent approach requires not only informed
decisions about when government should intervene to address moral hazard and
other problems, but also knowing when government intervention through bailouts
or otherwise makes problems worse.

